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COMMENTS
RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN DIVORCE DECREES IN NEW YORK-
KRAUSE V. KRAUSE
A vigorous dissenting opinion in an important appeal often foreshadows a
shift or trend in doctrine or policy. Such was the dissenting opinion of
Justices Holmes and Brandeis in the case of Evans v. Gore' involving the con-
stitutionality of the taxation of judicial salaries. That opinion presaged what
seems now to have been the inevitable change of policy of the Supreme Court
nineteen years later.2 Minority opinions often merely restate the formulae of
an old faith, while the process of building up and rationalizing the new faith
is going on, as reflected in some dissents of the conservative members of the
Supreme Court in the past several years. In such dissents the minority signifies
its intellectual inability to assent both to the premises and the conclusions of
the majority. Less frequently a dissenting opinion, conceding that the con-
clusion of the majority might make for better law, declares that principles
which are embedded in the law may not be abandoned to accomplish an ex-
pedient or even a just result in the individual case without at least a frank
avowal of the abandonment of such principles. This seems to be the function
of the minority opinion in an interesting case-Krause v. Krausea- recently
decided in the New York Court of Appeals on the question of the recognition
of foreign decrees of divorce.
In that case the plaintiff sued her husband in New York for a legal separation.
The defendant-husband pleaded as a defense that his marriage with the plain-
tiff was void because of his incapacity. It appeared that he had been previously
married and that while retaining his residence in New York had gone to Nevada
and obtained a decree of divorce on constructive service. He subsequently
married the plaintiff and lived with her for six years. The question before the
Court was the validity of his defense.
The decision was that the defense was not valid. The majority opinion, writ-
ten by Judge Finch, states that, although the divorce obtained by the defendant
in Nevada is unquestionably invalid in New York, the defendant is precluded
from questioning its validity; that "it is not open to defendant in these pro-
ceedings to avoid the responsibility which he voluntarily incurred" and that
the result in the case imports "complete observance of not only the interest of
the State in the protection of the first marriage, but also of the other interest
of the State that marriage obligations shall not be lightly undertaken and
lightly discarded.4
The view of the minority of the Court, as reflected in the dissenting opinion
of Judge Loughran, is that the defense is valid; that the reasoning of the
majority is inconsistent with previous decisions of the Court of Appeals, which
1. 253 U. S. 245 (1920).
2. O'Malley v. Woodrough, 307 U. S. 277 (1939).
3. 282 N. Y. 355, 26 N. E. (2d) 290 (1940).
4. .bid.
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cannot be distinguished from the instant case. It divides the cases relating to
foreign divorce decrees in which the principles of equitable preclusion or quasi
estoppel have been invoked into two categories. The first category includes
matrimonial actions, involving primarily the marital status;6 the second includes
private suits which are not matrimonial actions, although depending upon the
validity of foreign decrees of divorce.6 It is said that the public policy of the
State is directly involved in the first class of cases, but not in the second; that
the Court has given effect to the real status of the parties in the first class of
cases, applying the rigorous New York rule of conflict of laws,7 and has con-
sidered questions of equitable preclusion only in the second class. The con-
clusion is that the instant case falls clearly within the first category and that
consistency requires that the defense be declared valid, because of the invalidity
of defendant's foreign divorce and regardless of the apparent hardship to the
plaintiff.
Appropriate comment on the Krause decision might embrace discussions not
only of Conflict of Laws and Jurisdiction in Divorce. but even Judicial Process
and Jurisprudence. Much has already been written concerning the perplexing
and somewhat anomalous decisions in the State of New York and their rather
uneven trend to a more tolerant attitude to foreign divorce decrees. The policy
of the State of New York in refusing to apply the principle of comity was
stated by the Court of Appeals in 1879 in People v. Baker as follows:
"this principle (of comity) is not applied, when the laws and judicial acts of another
State are contrary to our own public policy, or to abstract justice or pure morals.
The policy of this State always has been, that there may of right be but one sufficient
cause for a divorce a vincUIo." 8
The Court also said in that case:
"It is not for the Court to disregard general and essential principles, so as to give
palliation." 9
It was not until 1906 that it was decided that such a policy was not entirely
hostile to the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution. 0  The
same policy, however, was reiterated in 1920 in the case of Hubbard v.
Hubbard."
An examination of the more recent New York cases, particularly such cases
5. Fischer v. Fischer, 254 N. Y. 463, 173 N. E. 6S0 (1930); Lefferts v. Lefferts, 263
N. Y. 131, 188 N. E. 279 (1933); Stevens v. Stevens, 273 N. Y. 157, 7 N. E. (2d) 26 (1937).
6. Starbuck v. Starbuck, 173 N. Y. 503, 66 N. E. 193 (1903); Brown v. Brown, 242
App. Div. 33, 272 N. Y, Supp. 877 (4th Dep't 1934), af'd uithout ophlion, 266 N. Y. 532,
195 N. E. 186 (1935); Hynes v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 273 N. Y. 612, 7 N. E. (2d)
719 (1937).
7. Stevens v. Stevens, 273 N. Y. 157, 7 N. E. (2d) 26 (1937).
8. 76 N. Y. 78, 88 (1879).
9. Id. at 87.
10. Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562 (1906).
11. 228 N. Y. 81, 126 N. E. 50S (1920).
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as Gould v. Godd,12 Glaser v. Glaser,13 and the Krause case, reveal that whether
the judicial exceptions are based upon considerations of equitable preclusion
or an actual change in policy, there is no longer the same demand that foreign
divorce decrees not measuring up to our standard be rejected. In a current
article, Professor Howe has carefully retraced the course of the New York cases
to show that recent decisions of the Court of Appeals have been predicated
on theories of jurisdiction in divorce other than status and domicile.14 In this
connection it is interesting to note that in the Krause case both parties in the
invalid Nevada divorce, which is indirectly given effect, were and continued to
be residents of the State of New York. and that the defendant in the Nevada
action did not appear and was not personally served.
Possibly very little remains of the concept of public policy that was stated
in the Baker case, because the so-called mores of that day are no longer ours.
The change in mores in New York may have been indicated in a more liberal
rule for marriage annulments,15 in the statutory amendment which virtually
added incurable insanity as another ground for divorce,10 or in a certain degree
of laxity in the granting of absolute divorce on the ground of adultery. Con-
cerning the failure of the New York Courts to apply the principle of comity
with respect to foreign decrees of divorce, and the consequent anomalous results,
the Court of Appeals in the Baker case stated that it was
"better by an adherence to the policy and law of our own jurisdiction, to make the
clash the more and the earlier known and felt, so that the sooner may there be an
authoritative determination of the conflict.' 17
If recent New York cases involve not merely the relaxation of the general prin-
ciple, but an abandonment of the old concept of public policy, it seems that
the "clash" and "conflict" have been given up.
FREDERICK L. KANEt
TAXATION OF INTERSTATE SALES-THE BERWIND CASE
Broad language and well-respected dicta for many years buttressed a firm
belief that sales in interstate commerce could not be taxed by the state of
ultimate delivery without violation of the commerce clause of the Constitution,'
12. 235 N. Y. 14, 138 N. E. 490 (1923).
13. 276 N. Y. 296, 12 N. E. (2d) 305 (1938).
14. The Recognition of Foreign Divorcd Decreesi in New York State (1940) 40 CO.
L. Rzv. 373. Cf. Davis v. Davis, 305 U. S. 32 (1938) discussed in Vreeland, Obligatory
Interstate Recognition of Divorce Decrees-A New Trend? (1939) 8 FoRrrA. L. Riv. 80.
15. Shonfeld v. Shonfeld, 260 N. Y. 477, 184 N. E. 60 (1933).
16. N. Y. Dom. REL. LAW (1928) § 7 (5).
17. People v. Baker, 76 N. Y. 78, at 87.
t" Professor of Law, Fordham University, School of Law.
1. See Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 447 (U. S. 1827); Robbins v. Shelby County
Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489, 497 (1887); Bowman v. Continental Oil Co., 256 U. S. 642,
648 (1921) ; Sonneborn v. Cureton, 262 U. S. 506, 509 (1923).
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